Braudy/Cohen 1999
Scientific criticism has an obligation to define its field
and methods. This implies awareness of its own historical and social situation,
a rigorous analysis of the proposed field of study, the conditions which make
the work necessary and those which make it possible, and the special function
it intends to fulfill.
It is essential that we at Cahiers du Cinéma should now
undertake just such a global analysis of our position and aims. Not that we are
starting entirely from zero. Fragments of such an analysis have been coming out
of material we have published recently (articles, editorials, debates, answers
to readers' letters) but in an imprecise form and as if by accident. They are
an indication that our readers, just as much as we ourselves, feel the need for
a clear theoretical base to which to relate our critical practice and its
field, taking the two to be indivisible. 'Programmes' and 'revolutionary' plans
and declarations tend to become an end in themselves. This is a trap we intend
to avoid. Our objective is not to reflect upon what we 'want' (would like) to
do, but upon what we are doing and what we can do, and this is impossible
without an analysis of the present situation.
WHERE?
(a) First, our situation. Cahiers is a group of people
working together; one of the results of our work appearing as a magazine.* A
magazine, that is to say, a particular product, involving a particular amount
of work (on the part of those who write it, those who produce it and, indeed,
those who read it). We do not close our eyes to the fact that a product of this
nature is situated fairly and squarely inside the eco- /753/ nomic system of
capitalist publishing (modes of production, spheres of circulation, etc.). In
any case it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise today, unless one is
led astray by Utopian ideas of working 'parallel' to the system. The first step
in the latter approach is always the paradoxical one of setting up a false front,
a 'neo-system' alongside the system from which one is attempting to escape, in
the fond belief that it will be able to negate the system. In fact all it can
do is reject it (idealist purism) and consequently it is very soon jeopardized
by the enemy upon which it modelled itself.[1] This 'parallelism' works from
one direction only. It touches only one side of the wound, whereas we believe
that both sides have to be worked upon. And the danger of the parallels meeting
all too speedily in infinity seems to us sufficient to argue that we had better
stay in the finite and allow them to remain apart.
This assumed, the question is: what is our attitude to our
situation? In France the majority of films, like the majority of books and
magazines, are produced and distributed by the capitalist economic system and
within the dominant ideology. Indeed, strictly speaking all are, whatever
expedient they adopt to try and get around it. This being so, the question we
have to ask is: which films, books, and magazines allow the ideology a free,
unhampered passage, transmit it with crystal clarity, serve as its chosen
language? And which attempt to make it turn back and reflect itself, intercept
it, make it visible by revealing its mechanisms, by blocking them?
(b) For the situation in which we are acting is the field of
cinema (Cahiers is a film magazine),[2] and the precise object of our study is
the history of a film: how it is produced, manufactured, distributed,[3]
understood.
What is the film today? This is the relevant question; not,
as it possibly once was: what is the cinema? We shall not be able to ask that
again until a body of knowledge, of theory, has been evolved (a process to
which we certainly intend to contribute) to inforrn what is at present an empty
term, with a concept. For a film magazine the question is also: what work is to
be done in the field constituted by films? And for Cahiers in particular: what
is our specific function in this field? What is to distinguish us from other
'film magazines'?
THE FILMS
What is a film? On the one hand it is a particular product,
manufactured within a given system of economic relations, and involving labour
(which appears to the capitalist as money) to produce—a condition to which even
'independent' filmmakers and the 'new cinema' are subject—assembling a certain
number of work- /754/ ers for this purpose (even the director, whether he is
Moullet or Oury, is in the last analysis only a film worker). It becomes
transformed into a commodity, possessing exchange value, which is realized by
the sale of tickets and contracts, and governed by the laws of the market. On
the other hand, as a result of being a material product of the system, it is
also an ideological product of the system, which in France means capitalism.+
No filmmaker can, by his own individual efforts, change the
economic relations governing the manufacture and distribution of his films. (It
cannot be pointed out too often that even filmmakers who set out to be
'revolutionary' on the level of message and form cannot effect any swift or
radical change in the economic system—deform it, yes, deflect it, but not
negate it or seriously upset its structure. Godard'srecent statement to the
effect that he wants to stop working in the 'system' takes no account of the fact
that any other system is bound to be a reflection of the one he wishes to
avoid. The money no longer comes from the Champs-Elysees but from London, Rome,
or New York. The film may not be marketed by the distribution monopolies but it
is shot on film stock from another monopoly—Kodak.) Because every film is part
of the economic system it is also a part of the ideological system, for
'cinema' and 'art' are branches of ideology. None can escape, somewhere, like
pieces in a jigsaw, all have their own allotted place. The system is blind to
its own nature, but in spite of that, indeed because of that, when all the
pieces are fitted together they give a very clear picture. But this does not
mean that every filmmaker plays a similar role. Reactions differ.
It is the job of criticism to see where they differ, and
slowly, patiently, not expecting any magical transformations to take place at
the wave of a slogan, to help change the ideology which conditions them.
A few points, which we shall return to in greater detail
later: every film is political, inasmuch as it is determined by the ideology
which produces it (or within which it is produced, which stems from the same
thing). The cinema is all the more thoroughly and completely determined because
unlike other arts or ideological systems its very manufacture mobilizes
powerful economic forces in a way that the production of literature (which
becomes the commodity 'books', does not—though once we reach the level of
distribution, publicity, and sale, the two are in rather the same position).
/755/
Clearly, the cinema 'reproduces' reality: this is what a
camera and film stock are for—so says the ideology. But the tools and
techniques of filmmaking are a part of 'reality' themselves, and furthermore
'reality' is nothing but an expression of the prevailing ideology. Seen in this
light, the classic theory of cinema that the camera is an impartial instrument
which grasps, or rather is impregnated by, the world in its 'concrete reality'
is an eminently reactionary one. What the camera in fact registers is the
vague, unformulated, untheorized, unthought-out world of the dominant ideology.
Cinema is one of the languages through which the world communicates itself to
itself. They constitute its ideology for they reproduce the world as it is
experienced when filtered through the ideology. (As Althusser defines it, more
precisely: 'Ideologies are perceived-accepted-suffered cultural objects, which
work fundamentally on men by a process they do not understand. What men express
in their ideologies is not their true relation to their conditions of
existence, but how they react to their conditions of existence; which
presupposes a real relationship and an imaginary relationship.) So, when we set
out to make a film, from the very first shot, we are encumbered by the
necessity of reproducing things not as they really are but as they appear when
refracted through the ideology. This includes every stage in the process of
production: subjects, 'styles', forms, meanings, narrative traditions; all
underline the general ideological discourse. The film is ideology presenting
itself to itself, talking to itself, learning about itself. Once we realize
that it is the nature of the system to turn the cinema into an instrument of
ideology, we can see that the filmmaker's first task is to show up the cinema's
so-called 'depiction of reality'. If he can do so there is a chance that we
will be able to disrupt or possibly even sever the connection between the
cinema and its ideological function
The vital distinction between films today is whether they do
this or whether they do not.
(a) The first and largest category comprises those films
which are imbued through and through with the dominant ideology in pure and
unadulterated form, and give no indication that their makers were even aware of
the fact. We are not just talking about so-called 'commercial' films. The
majority of films in all categories are the unconscious instruments of the
ideology which produces them. Whether the film is 'commercial' or 'ambitious',
'modern' or 'traditional', whether it is the type that gets shown in art
houses, or in smart cinemas, whether it belongs to the 'old' cinema or the
'young' cinema, it is most likely to be a re-hash of the same old ideology. For
all films are commodities and therefore objects of trade, even those whose
discourse is explicitly political—which is why a rigorous definition of what
constitutes 'political' cinema is called for at this moment when it is being
widely promoted. This merging of ideology and film is reflected in the first
instance by the fact that audience demand and economic response have also been
reduced to one and the same thing. In direct continuity with political
practice, ideological practice reformulates the social need and backs it up with
a discourse. This is not a hypothesis, but a scientifically established fact.
The ideology is talking to itself; it has all the answers ready before it asks
the questions. Certainly there is such a thing as public demand, but 'what the
public wants' means 'what the dominant ideology wants'. The notion of a public
and its tastes was created by the ideology to justify and perpetuate itself.
And this public can only express itself via the thought-/756/ patterns of the
ideology. The whole thing is a closed circuit, endlessly repeating the same
illusion.
The situation is the same at the level of artistic form.
These fi]ms totally accept the established system of depicting reality:
'bourgeois realism' and the whole conservative box of tricks: blind faith in
'life', 'humanism', 'common sense', etc. A blissful ignorance that there might
be something wrong with this whole concept of 'depiction' appears to have
reigned at every stage in their production, so much so, that to us it appears a
more accurate gauge of pictures in the 'commercial' category than boxoffice
returns. Nothing in these films jars against the ideology or the audience's
mystification by it. They are very reassuring for audiences for there is no
difference between the ideology they meet every day and the ideology on the
screen. It would be a useful complementary task for film critics to look into
the way the ideological system and its products merge at all levels: to study
the phenomenon whereby a film being shown to an audience becomes a monologue, in
which the ideology talks to itself, by examining the success of films by, for
instance, Melville, Oury, and Lelouch.
(b) A second category is that of films which attack their
ideological assimilation on two fronts. Firstly, by direct political action, on
the level of the 'signified', that is, they deal with a directly political
subject. 'Deal with' is here intended in an active sense: they do not just
discuss an issue, reiterate it, paraphrase it, but use it to attack the
ideology (this presupposes a theoretical activity which is the direct opposite
of the ideological one). This act only becomes politically effective if it is
linked with a breaking down of the traditional way of depicting reality. On the
level of form, Unreconciled, The Edge and Earth in Revolt all challenge the
concept of 'depiction' and mark a break with the tradition embodying it.
We would stress that only action on both fronts, 'signified'
and 'signifiers"[4] has any hope of operating against the prevailing
ideology. Economic/political and formal action have to be indissolubly wedded.
(c) There is another category in which the same double
action operates, but 'against the grain'. The content is not explicitly
political, but in some way becomes so through the criticism practised on it
through its form.[5] To this category belong /757/ Méditerraneé, The
Bellboy,Persona.... For Cahiers these films (b and c) constitute the essential
in the cinema, and should be the chief subject of the magazine.
(d) Fourth case: those films, increasingly numerous today,
which have an explicitly political content (Z is not the best example as its
presentation of politics is unremittingly ideological from first to last; a
better example would be Le Temps de Vivre) but which do not effectively
criticize the ideological system in which they are embedded because they
unquestioningly adopt its language and its imagery.
This makes it important for critics to examine the
effectiveness of the political criticism intended by these films. Do they
express, reinforce, strengthen the very thing they set out to denounce? Are
they caught in the system they wish to break down . . . ? (see a)
(e) Five: films which seem at first sight to belong firmly
within the ideology and to be completely under its sway, but which turn out to
be so only in an ambiguous manner. For though they start from a nonprogressive
standpoint, ranging from the frankly reactionary through the conciliatory to
the mildly critical, they have been worked upon, and work, in such a real way
that there is a noticeable gap, a dislocation, between the starting point and
the finished product. We disregard here the inconsistent—and unimportant—sector
of films in which the director makes a conscious use of the prevailing
ideology, but leaves it absolutely straight. The films we are talking about
throw up obstacles in the way of the ideology, causing it to swerve and get off
course. The cinematic framework lets us see it, but also shows it up and
denounces it. Looking at the framework one can see two moments in it: one holding
it back within certain limits, one transgressing them. An internal criticism is
taking place which cracks the film apart at the seams. If one reads the film
obliquely, looking for symptoms; if one looks beyond its apparent formal
coherence, one can see that it is riddled with cracks: it is splitting under an
internal tension which is simply not there in an ideologically innocuous film.
The ideology thus becomes subordinate to the text. It no longer has an
independent existence: It is presented by the film. This is the case in many
Hollywood films, for example, which while being completely integrated in the
system and the ideology end up by partially dismantling the system from within.
We must find out what makes it possible for a filmmaker to corrode the ideology
by restating it in the terms of his film: if he sees his film simply as a blow
in favour of liberalism, it will be recuperated instantly by the ideology; if
on the other hand, he conceives and realizes it on the deeper level of imagery,
there is a chance that it will turn out to be more disruptive. Not, of course,
that he will be able to break the ideology itself, but simply its reflection in
his film. (The films of Ford, Dreyer, Rossellini, for example.)
Our position with regard to this category of films is: that
we have absolutely no intention of joining the current witch-hunt against them.
They are the mythology of their own myths. They criticize themselves, even if
no such intention is written into the script, and it is irrelevant and impertinent
to do so for them. All we want to do is to show the process in action.
(f) Films of the 'live cinema' (cinéma direct) variety,
group one (the larger of the two groups). These are films arising out of
political (or, it would probably be more exact to say: social) events or
reflections, but which make no clear differentiation between themselves and the
nonpolitical cinema because they do not challenge the /758/ cinema's
traditional, ideologically conditioned method of 'depiction'. For instance a
miner's strike will be filmed in the same style as Les Grandes Familles. The
makers of these films suffer under the primary and fundamental illusion that if
they once break off the ideological filter of narrative traditions (dramaturgy,
construction, domination of the component parts by a central idea, emphasis on
formal beauty) reality will then yield itself up in its true form. The fact is
that by doing so they only break off one filter, and not the most important one
at that. For reality holds within itself no hidden kernel of
self-understanding, of theory, of truth, like a stone inside a fruit. We have
to manufacture those. (Marxism is very clear on this point, in its distinction
between 'real' and 'perceived' objects.) Compare Chiefs (Leacock) and a good
number of the May films.
This is why supporters of cinéma direct resort to the same
idealist terminology to express its role and justify its successes as others
use about products of the greatest artifice: 'accuracy', 'a sense of lived
experience', 'flashes of intense truth', 'moments caught live', 'abolition of
all sense that we are watching a film' and finally: fascination. It is that
magical notion of 'seeing is understanding': ideology goes on display to
prevent itself from being shown up for what it really is, contemplates itself
but does not criticize itself.
(g) The other kind of 'live cinema'. Here the director is
not satisfied with the idea of the camera 'seeing through appearances', but
attacks the basic problem of depiction by giving an active role to the concrete
stuff of his film. It then becomes productive of meaning and is not just a
passive receptacle for meaning produced outside it (in the ideology): La Regne
du Jour, La Rentre'e des Usines Wonder.
CRITICAL FUNCTION
Such, then, is the field of our critical activity: these
films, within the ideology, and their different relations to it. From this
precisely defined field spring four functions: (1) in the case of the films in
category (a): show what they are blind to; how they are totally determined, moulded,
by the ideology; (2) in the case of those in categories (b), (c) and (g), read
them on two levels, showing how the films operate critically on the level of
signified and signifiers; (3) in the case of those of types (d) and (f), show
how the signified (political subject matter) is always weakened, rendered
harmless, by the absence of technical/theoretical work on the signifiers; (4)
in the case of those in group (e) point out the gap produced between film and
ideology by the way the films work, and show how they work.
There can be no room in our critical practice either for
speculation (commentary, interpretation, de-coding even) or for specious raving
(of the film-columnist variety). It must be a rigidly factual analysis of what
governs the production of a film (economic circumstances, ideology, demand, and
response) and the meanings and forms appearing in it, which are equally
tangible.
The tradition of frivolous and evanescent writing on the
cinema is as tenacious as it is prolific, and film analysis today is still
massively predetermined by idealistic presuppositions. It wanders farther
abroad today, but its method is still basically empirical. It has been through
a necessary stage of going back to the material elements of film, its
signifying structures, its formal organizations. The first steps here /759/were
undeniably taken by André Bazin, despite the contradictions that can be picked
out in his articles. Then followed the approach based on structural linguistics
(in which there are two basic traps, which we fell into—phenomenological
positivism and mechanistic materialism). As surely as criticism had to go
through this stage, it has to go beyond. To us, the only possible line of
advance seems to be to use the theoretical writing of the Russian filmmakers of
the twenties (Eisenstein above all) to elaborate and apply a critical theory of
the cinema, a specific method of apprehending rigorously defined objects, in
direct reference to the method of dialectical materialism.
It is hardly necessary to point out that we know that the
'policy' of a magazine cannot—indeed, should not—be corrected by magic
overnight. We have to do it patiently, month by month, being careful in our own
field to avoid the general error of putting faith in spontaneous change, or
attempting to rush into a 'revolution' without the preparation to support it.
To start proclaiming at this stage that the truth has been revealed to us would
be like talking about 'miracles' or 'conversion'. All we should do is to state
what work is already in progress and publish articles which relate to it,
either explicitly or implicitly.
We should indicate briefly how the various elements in the
magazine fit into this perspective. The essential part of the work obviously
takes place in the theoretical articles and the criticisms. There is coming to
be less and less of a difference between the two, because it is not our concern
to add up the merits and defects of current films in the interests of
topicality, nor, as one humorous article put it 'to crack up the product'. The
interviews, on the other hand, and also the 'diary' columns and the list of
films, with the dossiers and supplementary material for possible discussion
later, are often stronger on information than theory. It is up to the reader to
decide whether these pieces take up any critical stance, and if so, what.
1969
________________________________________
*Others include distribution, screening, and discussion of
films in the provinces and the suburbs, sessions of theoretical work.
[1] Or tolerated, and jeopardized by this very toleration.
Is there any need to stress that it is the tried tactic of covertly repressive
systems not to harass the protesting fringe? They go out of their way to take
no notice of them, with the double effect of making one half of the opposition
careful not to try their patience too far and the other half complacent in the
knowledge that their activities are unobserved.
[2] We do not intend to suggest by this that we want to
erect a corporatist fence round our own field, and neglect the infinitely
larger field where so much is obviously at stake politically. Simply, we are
concentrating on that precise point of the spectrum of social activity in this
article, in response to precise operational needs.
[3] A more and more pressing problem. It would be inviting
confusion to allow it to be tackled in bits and pieces and obviously we have to
make a unified attempt to pose it theoretically later on. For the moment we
leave it aside.
+Capitalist ideology. This term expresses our meaning
perfectly, but as we are going to use it without further definition in this
article, we should point out that we are not under any illusion that it has
some kind of 'abstract essence'. We know that it is historically and socially
detemmined, and that it has multiple fomms at any given place and time, and
varies from historical period to historical period. Like the whole category of
'militant' cinema, which is totally vague and undefined at present. We must (a)
rigorously define the function attributed to it, its aims, its side effects
(information, arousal, critical reflection, provocation 'which always has some
effect' . . .); (b) define the exact political line governing the making and
screening of these films—'revolutionary' is too much of a blanket term to serve
any useful purpose here; and (c) state whether the supporters of militant
cinema are in fact proposing a line of action in which the cinema would become
the poor relation, in the illusion that the less the cinematic aspect is worked
on, the greater the strength and clarity of the 'militant' effect will be. This
would be a way of avoiding the contradictions of 'parallel' cinema and getting
embroiled in the problem of deciding whether 'underground' films should be
included in the category, on the pretext that their relationship to drugs and
sex, their preoccupation with form, might possibly establish new relationships
between film and audience.
[4] We are not shutting our eyes to the fact that it is an
oversimplification (employed here because operationally easier) to make such a
sharp distinction between the two terms. This is particularly so in the case of
the cinema, where the signified is more often than not a product of the
permutations of the signifiers, and the sign has dominance over the meaning.
[5] This is not a magical doorway out of the system of
'depiction' (which is particularly dominant in the cinema) but rather a
rigorous, detailed, large-scale work on this system—what conditions make it
possible, what mechanisms render it innocuous. The method is to draw attention
to the system so that it can be seen for what it is, to make it serve one's own
ends, condemn itself out of its own mouth. Tactics employed may include
'turning cinematic syntax upside-down' but it cannot be just that. Any old film
nowadays can upset the normal chronological order in the interests of looking
vaguely 'modern'. But The Exterminating Angel and The Diary of Anna Magdalena
Bach(though we would not wish to set them up as a model) are rigorously chronological
without ceasing to be subversive in the way we have been describing, whereas in
many a film the mixed-up time sequence simply covers up a basically
naturalistic conception. In the same way, perceptual confusion (avowed intent
to act on the unconscious mind, changes in the texture of the film, etc.) are
not sufficient in themselves to get beyond the traditional way of depicting
'reality'. To realize this, one has only to remember the unsuccessful attempts
there have been of the 'lettriste' or 'zacum' type to give back its infinity to
language by using nonsense words or new kinds ofonomatopoeia. In the one and
the other case only the most superficial level of language is touched. They
create a new code, which operates on the level of the impossible, and has to be
rejected on any other, and is therefore not in a position to transgress the
normal.
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